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) 
) 
) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County, Idaho. 
The order appealed from is dated May 23. 2013 and was entered by the Honorable Kathryn A. 
Sticklen. a Senior District Court Judge. Ada County. Idaho. who reviewed this case on appeal 
from a ruling granting summary judgment to Plaintiff-Respondent by the Magistrate's Division. 
The ruling of the Magistrate that was appealed to the District Court of Ada County is dated 
November 25, 2011 and was entered by the Honorable Christopher Bieter. Magistrate. 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Wesley W. Hoyt 
Law Offices of Wesley W. Hoyt 
165 Deer Field Drive 
Clearwater, Idaho 83552 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) 
MARGARET A. BUTCHER; 
Defendant-Ms. McCluskey. 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 41188-2013 
DENNIS D. BUTCHER; and John Does 1-10, 
whose true identity is unknown, as Occupants 
of the Premises located at 10512 W. Achillea 
Street, Star, Idaho, 83669, 
Defendants. 
) Case No. CV-OC-2011-13288 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a District Court Order affirming the ruling of 
a Magistrate that granted summary judgment of eviction resulting in the ejectment of a 
homeowner from her residence after foreclosure sale. The homeowner ("Margaret Butcher, nlk/a 
McCluskey"!) contended below that the Trustee's Deed obtained at foreclosure sale was invalid 
and that Plaintiff-Respondent ("FHLMC" or "Freddie Mac") had no lawful claim for possession 
to her residence, which is the Subject Property. 
Course of Proceedings Below. Freddie Mac filed this action in Magistrate's Court for 
ejectment of McCluskey from the Subject Property after having obtained a Trustee's Deed at a 
1 Defendants Peggy Butcher and Dennis Butcher divorced in 2009. Ms. Butcher received the 
residence at 10512 W. Achillea Street, Star, Idaho, 83669 ("Subject Property") as her sole and 
separate property in the divorce. Ms. Butcher married Randall McCluskey in 2013 and herein 
will be referred to by her married name. 
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foreclosure sale on May 16, 2011. Freddie Mac filed for summary judgment on September 28, 
2011. After having the period for filing extended by the Court, Ms. McCluskey was denied by 
the Clerk of the District Court of Ada County the opportunity to file her Response to Summary 
Judgment on November 15, 2011; on that date she was only permitted to file a preprinted form of 
'Answer' (R. Bates #130). During the hearing of November 22,2011 she was permitted to 
'bench file' her "Response to Motion for Summary Judgment," (see R. Bates #162, et seq.) but 
she had not received a copy of Freddie Mac's most recent filing, which was an Affidavit with 
new information and documents attached, that it was permitted to file on November 21,2011 
(see R. Bates #139). 
Although the trial court indicated that he would consider all documents filed by her, 
Judge Bieter proceeded to enter summary judgment on November 25,2011 (see R. Bates #552) 
prior to Ms. McCluskey's filing of her "Reply Memorandum" on December 5,2011 (see Bates 
#557 et. Seq.). 
The Certificate of Service (dated November 21,2011, see R. Bates #133-138) clearly 
shows that the Ms. McCluskey did not have, before oral argument, adequate notice of Freddie 
Mac's Reply Memorandum or the Affidavit of JeffStenman and the new documents that 
accompanied it (R. Bates #139-160). She has indicated that she received them on November 23, 
2011. Nevertheless, Judge Bieter assured her that he would consider all her court filings. 
When Judge Bieter entered his November 25, 2011 Order Granting Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. Bates #552) he clearly did not consider Ms. McCluskey filings of December 5, 
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2011 (R. Bates #557). Thus, she did not have an opportunity to present rebuttal information nor 
was she in a position to make an effective oral argument at the summary judgment hearing. 
Further, the trial court did not review and consider the documents she timely filed on 
December 5, 2011 (R. Bates #557) in response to the late-filed documents by Freddie Mac. 
In her filings with the Magistrate's Court, Ms. McCluskey raised all the issues that are 
raised herein, but neither the Magistrate nor the District Court were able to perceive her 
argument. 
Ms. McCluskey appealed the Magistrate's decision to the District Court which was 
erroneously affirmed and she appeals to this Court for de novo review based on a structural 
defect where she raised the disputed issues of material fact they were ignored or glossed over by 
both courts below because of an unspoken presumption of correctness attributed to the Freddie 
Mac. 
Concise Statement of Facts. Ms. McCluskey and her former husband put $80,000 down 
on the purchase of the Subject Property on December 15,2005 CR. Bates # 000094) financing the 
balance of the purchase with a mortgage of$147,900 through Home Federal Bank of Boise, 
Idaho. They also executed a Deed of Trust on December 14,2005 (R. Bates # 000109). 
Thereafter, Home Federal Bank, indorsed the Note "Without Recourse, Pay to the Order of 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A." CR. Bates #000096) signed "by Peg Mixdorf, Secondary Market 
Specialist III" of Home Federal Bank. 
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A second indorsement, confirming the first, appears on the next page of the Record at 
Bates #000097, with the same language: "Without Recourse, Pay to the Order of WELLS 
FARGO BANK, N.A." CR. Bates #000097). 
An Assignment of Trust Deed was recorded in the mortgage records of Ada County, 
Idaho naming Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") as the new beneficiary. 
Ms. McCluskey's evidence showed that in 2008, after her divorce, she was informed by 
Wells Fargo to cease making payments as specified by the Note and to commence making 
payments under the terms of a loan modification program known as the "Home Affordable 
Modification Program" (or "HAMP"). HAMP was at that time supervised by Freddie Mac CR. 
Bates #000745)? 
Ms. McCluskey alleged below that she complied exactly with the terms of the Wells 
Fargo loan modification by, (1) making every loan modification payment as agreed, (2) paying 
off a second mortgage to clear all liens from the Subject Property, and (3) declaring bankruptcy 
so that no other creditors could make a claim on her earned income, leaving it fully available to 
make the loan modification payments. 
2 " ••• FREDDIE MAC SERVES AS THE PROGRAM'S COMPLIANCE AGENTFOR ALL GSE OWNED OR 
GUARANTEED LOANS, SERVICER PARTICIPA TIONIS REQUIRED. " Sec 4 pg 39 Attorney General's Report 
on the Idaho Housing Crisis and How Stakeholders Can Facilitate Cooperative Solutions Consumer Protection Div. 
Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General, FEB 2011. "Compliance Agent: Freddie Mac acting as a financial agent of the 
United States Department of the Treasury will manage the compliance and monitoring of Servicer performance 
under the Program, including performance in accordance with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae requirements." C65.3: 
Delegation of Authority (04/21109). 
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Ms. McCluskey claimed in the Magistrate's Court and on appeal to the District Court that 
she was not in default of her mortgage as of the foreclosure date of May 16, 2011 because of her 
compliance with the HAMP program sponsored by Wells Fargo and supervised by Freddie Mac. 
It was Ms. McCluskey's contention that since Freddie Mac was the compliance agent for HAMP 
and since Freddie Mac regulated Wells Fargo it was charged with notice of her compliance in 
respect to Wells Fargo's loan modification program. 
A key feature of the HAMP program is that the banks under Freddie Mac's regulation 
including Wells Fargo are prohibited from "Dual Tracking," i.e., proceeding with foreclosure 
while implementing a loan modification. (R. Bates #287-295.) 
Freddie Mac asserted that it was a bona fide purchaser for value of the Note and therefore 
had no notice as to any of McCluskey's defenses with respect to the mortgage loan on the 
Subject Property. Part of Freddie Mac's claim was that it became the successor lender to Wells 
Fargo having the right to purchase the Subject Property by credit bid at the foreclosure sale 
auction. (R. Plaintiffs Complaint, Bates #s 000006, at ~ I, and 000117 and 000137). There is no 
dispute in this proceeding that Freddie Mac purchased the property by credit bid at the Trustee's 
Sale of May 16,2011 (R. Bates #554, ~ 10.) 
By claiming that it was a bona fide purchaser for value of the Note, Freddie Mac was 
claiming that it had protection under the shelter rules ofLC. §§45-1508 and 45-1510. A question 
of fact was raised by Ms. McCluskey whether Freddie Mac could be both a bona fide purchaser 
and the successor lender, since the two are mutually exclusive. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Ms. McCluskey, in the Magistrate's Court, raised a dispute as to a material fact 
that Freddie Mac's claim of possession fails as a matter of law because it did not comply 
with I.C. §45-l505(l) prior to the foreclosure sale. 
2. Whether Ms. McCluskey, in the Magistrate's Court, raised a dispute as to a material fact 
that Freddie Mac was not the holder of the Note at the time of the foreclosure sale 
showing that it was not entitled to purchase the Subject Property by credit bid. 
3. Whether Ms. McCluskey's right to due process of law prior to being deprived of her 
property by foreclosure sale was violated by the trial court when it denied her a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate her claims and defenses to the summary judgment which were 
aimed at raising disputed issues of material fact. 
4. Whether Freddie Mac was entitled to claim the status of a bona fide purchaser for value 
under the shelter rules of I.C. §§45-l508 and 45-1510 when it was the successor lender 
that offered a credit bid at the May 16,2011 Trustee's Sale and whether such assertion 
was in violation ofI.C. §45-l506(9). 
5. Whether there was a question of fact presented to the Magistrate as to whether Freddie 
Mac had a valid interest in the Subject Property as a result of the foreclosure sale when it 
violated its own rules and regulations against Dual-Tracking by participating in 
foreclosure on the Subject Property. 
6. Whether the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction over this case because Freddie Mac was not 
the lawful owner of a right of possession of the Subject Property. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue No.1: Whether Ms. McCluskey, in the Magistrate's Court, raised a dispute as to a 
material fact that Freddie Mac's claim of possession fails as a matter of law because it did not 
comply with I.C. §45-1505(l) prior to the foreclosure sale. 
Summary of Argument No.1: The Trial Court erred in awarding possession of the 
Subject Property by summary judgment to Freddie Mac when there was a genuine issue of 
disputed fact whether Freddie Mac had complied with I.e. § 45-1505(1) requiring the 
recording of all Assignments of the Trust Deed in the mortgage records of the county 
where the property is located prior to foreclosure and since there was no recorded 
assignment from Wells Fargo to Freddie Mac, therefore the property sale and the Trustee's 
Deed are void ab initio, because it was a law violation for Freddie Mac to purchase the 
Subject Property by credit bid without having complied with said statute. 
Appellant's Brief Page 6 
When a mortgage lender seeks to foreclose on a property, it has the choice to pursue a 
judicial foreclosure, or to foreclose non-judicially. Non-judicial foreclosure is often quicker and 
more cost effective and generally favored by mortgage lenders. Judicial foreclosure is overseen 
by an objective court, ensuring that all proper foreclosure requirements have been met by both 
parties and that the Foreclosure is lawful and fair to both parties. 
Non-judicial foreclosure does not provide the same judicial oversight where injustice 
may occur with less sophisticated parties; hence, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that in a non-
judicial foreclosure, strict compliance3 with the Idaho Foreclosure Act4 (the "Act") is required. 
In order to prevent foreclosure injustice, the Idaho Legislature enacted a very specific foreclosure 
statute known as the Idaho Foreclosure Act (the "Act"). A mortgage lender, by choosing to 
foreclose non-judicially, may benefit by a faster, more cost efficient foreclosure process, but to 
balance the greater likelihood that shortcuts or and to prevent corruption, it must strictly comply 
with Idaho's foreclosure statutes (see fn 3). 
One provision of the Act is I.e. § 45-1505(1) which provides that prior to foreclosure, the 
trust deed and "any assignments of that trust deed ... by the beneficiary" must be recorded in the 
mortgage records of the county where the property is located. There was initial compliance with 
this statute when the Assignment of Trust Deed from Home Federal Bank, as the original 
beneficiary, assigned the Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo. However, in order for Freddie Mac to 
claim that it was a creditor of Ms. McCluskey so that it could make a "credit bid," at the non-
3 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 44,137 P.3d 429,431 
(2006). 
4 Idaho Code § 45-1501, et. Seq. 
Appellant's Brief Page 7 
judicial foreclosure sale on the Subject Property it needed to show that it was the holder of the 
Note and that there had been strict compliance with the Act in order to for the foreclosure and 
resulting foreclosure sale to be valid. (See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Appel 
143 Idaho 42, 44, 137 P.3d 429,431 (2006). 
The Subject Property was scheduled for foreclosure on May 16, 2011 upon the Notice of 
Default by Wells Fargo, as beneficiary of the Deed of Trust and as holder of the Note according 
to other disclosure documents, such as the Notice of Trustee's Sale. Wells Fargo, not Freddie 
Mac, is the entity indentified as the holder of the beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust 
according to the Notice of Default and other foreclosure Documents. In compliance with I.e. § 
45-1505(1) an Assignment of Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo was recorded (Trial Record "Tr." at 
Bates # 265). 
The Promissory Note was originally made Payable to Horne Federal Bank, but contains 
two specific indorsements both of which direct payment to the order of Wells Fargo (Tr. at Bates 
#s 96 and 97). 5 
As of the date of the Trustee's Sale, the current note holder and beneficiary on the Trust 
Deed was Wells Fargo, making it the only party entitled to issue a credit bid at auction for a non-
judicial foreclosure sale under the Act. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Appel 
143 Idaho 42, 44 137 P.3d 429,431 (2006). The Trustee's Deed6 shows that Purchaser of the 
Property at the foreclosure sale was not Wells Fargo, but was Freddie Mac. There is no 
Assignment of Trustee's Deed in favor of Freddie Mac recorded in the real estate and mortgage 
5 The language of the two indorsements reads as follows: first at R. Bates # 96; second, at R. Bates #97. 
6 Trustee's Deed R. at Bates #74 and 159-160. 
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records of Ada County, Idaho.7 FREDDIE MAC has admitted that they purchased the property 
via credit bid at the foreclosure sale. 8 Pursuant to this Court's holding in Appel, only the current 
note holder has the right to purchase the property by a credit bid, and all other purchasers must 
pay cash. Since FREDDIE MAC did not pay cash, but submitted a credit bid when it was neither 
the current Note holder nor beneficiary on the Trust Deed, the foreclosure sale was not valid and 
was void. Since the foreclosure sale was not valid, the Trustee's Deed is not valid, and must be 
set aside. Therefore, Freddie Mac had no right to possession of the Subject Property, and the 
Trial Court erred when it granted it Motion for Summary Judgment awarding it a Writ of 
Ejectment. 
These arguments and issues of fact were brought to the Magistrate's and District court's 
attention in the previous ejectment hearings, but were not considered by either court. Ms. 
McCluskey presented evidence to the Magistrate showing that Respondent was not entitled to 
purchase the property by credit bid because Freddie Mac was not the owner of Ms. McCluskey'S 
Promissory Note as of the date of the foreclosure sale and that there was no Assignment of Deed 
of trust in favor of Freddie Mac recorded in the mortgage records of Ada County. Wells Fargo 
was the holder of the note by indorsement and the one entitled to enforce it (not Freddie Mac) 
and Wells Fargo was the only entity entitled to purchase Ms. McCluskey'S residence by credit 
bid at the foreclosure sale. 
Ms. McCluskey made a showing that there was, at a minimum, a material issue of 
disputed fact whether Respondent had a legal right to claim possession of the Subject Property in 
7 Affidavit of Peggy Butcher, R. at Bates #642. 
8 Freddie Mac's admission that it purchased the Subject Property by credit bid R. Bates #] 17. 
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the ejectment action before the Magistrate or whether there was a violation related to the 
issuance of the Trustee's Deed at the foreclosure sale making said deed void or voidable. This 
question of fact by itself should have blocked the entry of summary judgment. 
Issue No.2: Whether Ms. McCluskey, in the Magistrate's Court, raised a dispute as to a 
material fact that Freddie Mac's was not the holder of the Note at the time of the foreclosure sale 
showing that it was not entitled to purchase the Subject Property by credit bid. 
Summary of Argument No.2: The Trial Court erred in awarding possession of the 
Subject Property to Freddie Mac by summary judgment because there was a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Freddie Mac was the holder of the Note, when there was no 
specific indosement from Wells Fargo and there was no indorsement on the Note 'in 
blank;' therefore, Wells Fargo (and not Freddie Mac) was the only party with authority to 
offer a credit bid at the foreclosure sale and receive a Trustee's Deed. 
Wells Fargo Bank was the proper holder of the Note at the time of the foreclosure sale, 
and therefore was the only party with authority to offer a credit bid at the foreclosure sale (not 
Freddie Mac). 
Ms. McCluskey raised the issue of ownership of the Note in the Magistrate Court given 
that Freddie Mac filed a copy of the Note with to indorsements on it, both of which showed that 
the Note had been indorsed to Wells Fargo (R. Bates #s 96 and 97); however, the Magistrate 
failed to properly consider the affidavits, pleadings and arguments presented, and erroneously 
awarded Summary Judgment in favor of Freddie Mac in spite of the fact that, at a minimum, 
there was a question as to a genuine issue of material fact as to which party was the holder of the 
Note. 
Under the Idaho UCC, a promissory note is a "negotiable instrument". I.C. § 28-3-104(5). 
Negotiable instruments may be passed from one holder to another by negotiation, transfer and 
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indorsement. I.C. §§ 28-3-201,28-3-203,28-3-204. The UCC further provides that a note may 
be indorsed to a specific person, or may contain an indorsement in blank. A special endorsement 
becomes payable to the identified person, and can only be enforced by that person. I.C. § 28-3-
205. 
The Note presented by the Plaintiff in the present case, was originally made Payable to 
Home Federal Bank, but contains two specific indorsements with payment to the "order of Wells 
Fargo Bank, NA" and does not contain an indorsement "in blank." As such the then current note 
holder was "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." not Freddie Mac. As the current Note holder, creditor and 
named beneficiary on the Assignment of Trust Deed, only Wells Fargo was entitled to issue a 
credit bid at auction by a non-judicial foreclosure sale. All other parties if purchasing the 
property at the foreclosure sale are required to pay cash. I.e. § 45-1508, and see Appel, supra. 
As a result, Freddie Mac did not have legal standing to place a credit bid and the improper 
acceptance of Freddie Mac's erroneous credit bid, and issuance of the Trustee's Deed to Freddie 
Mac, invalidated the sale. 
These issues and argument were brought to the attention of the court of the Magistrate 
and District Judge, but were not properly considered. Ms. McCluskey asserted that the evidence 
Respondent presented to the Magistrate misled the judge into believing that Respondent was the 
holder of the Promissory Note by virtue of an indorsement "in blank" (see R. Bates # 70, O'Neill 
Affidavit see Bates #s 96 and 97, where there are two indorsements back to back, neither of 
which are "in blank") It appears that Freddie Mac was asking the trial court to assume, without 
any further evidence that somehow, within those endorsements, one of them constituted an 
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endorsement in blank. However, both are UCC specific endorsements of a negotiable instrument 
designating "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." as the indorsee\ In fact, as has been explained herein 
the Respondent has never provided a copy of the Note showing that was indorsed in blank. The 
only Note presented contains specific indorsements to Wells Fargo, not to Freddie Mac. (Id.) 
Consequently, only Wells Fargo could present a credit bid, and any other entity would be 
required to pay cash. There is no information in the record that connects Freddie Mac with Wells 
Fargo making them the same entity authorizing Freddie Mac to present a credit bid on behalf of 
Wells Fargo. Under the plan providing for non-judicial foreclosure pursuant to the Act, once 
Wells Fargo offered its credit bid, as the true creditor, it could assign its rights to Freddie Mac; 
but, that is not what happened here. 
Ms. McCluskey asserts that this is not a mere formality to point out the erroneous credit 
bid and transfer to Freddie Mac failed to meet the standards set by Idaho Code. Ms. McCluskey 
had real defenses to Wells Fargo's assertion of a credit bid at the foreclosure sale. For instance, 
she had the right to assert that she was not in default as against Wells Fargo, which defense, inter 
alia, she attempted to assert before the Magistrate Court. In fact, Wells Fargo's records showed 
she had paid exactly as agreed, which means Wells Fargo was not entitled to foreclose; however, 
by a pretended indorsement in blank, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac, acting in concert with each 
other were able to erroneously foreclose on the Subject Property and avoid the question of 
payment, which Freddie Mac claims does not apply to it because it is a bona fide purchaser. 
9 The first indorsement to Wells Fargo is on Bates page # 96 and the second indorsement to 
Wells Fargo is on Bates page # 97. 
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Thus, the issue of payment was avoided by the pretended authority of Freddie Mac to 
issue a credit bid. Ms. McCluskey is likely to prevail on her appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court 
based on the fact that Summary Judgment was predicated on trial court errors and 
misrepresentation Freddie Mac that created the misimpression that it was the holder of the 
Promissory Note, by an indorsement in blank when no such indorsement existed. Further, the 
lower court error was that both the Magistrate and the District Court relied upon the 
misrepresentation by Freddie Mac with the added error of ignoring Ms. McCluskey arguments 
and refusing to allow her to file her responses before the final decision was made on summary 
judgment. 
Issue No.3: Whether Ms. McCluskey's right to due process oflaw prior to being 
deprived of her property by foreclosure sale was violated by the trial court when it denied her a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims and defenses to the summary judgment which were 
aimed at raising disputed issues of material fact. 
.Summary of Argument No.3: The Trial Court Did Not Provide Ms. McCluskey a 
Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate Her Claims and Defenses Because All Disputed Facts 
and Inferences Should Have Been Taken in the Light Most Favorable to Ms. McCluskey. 
Ms. McCluskey raised in her Answer to the Complaint for Ejectment in Magistrate Court 
and in her other pleadings filed therewith the above questions of fact, but, both her arguments 
and her pleadings were ignored by the lower court judges. Ms. McCluskey raises on appeal the 
issue that her written and oral arguments were ignored and not heard and that she did not have a 
full and fair opportunity to present her case. 
Ms. McCluskey, in her pleadings in the court below, in her Notice of Appeal to the 
District Court, and in her Amended Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, asserts that 
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue of ejectment because the Trustee's 
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Sale was invalid and the Trustee's Deed was void based on improprieties in the foreclosure sale. 
Ms. McCluskey asserted that there are genuine issues of material fact, to wit: 1) Ms. McCluskey 
asserts that Respondent ("Freddie Mac") was not the holder of the Note at the time of the 
Trustee's Foreclosure Sale ("Trustee's Sale") so it was not entitled to purchase the subject 
property by credit bid per Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 
429 (2006) as that case interpreted the effect of I. e. §45-1508; and 2) that Ms. McCluskey had 
paid as agreed on the Note up to and including the time of the foreclosure sale. 
Ms. McCluskey raised the genuine issue of fact that the only indorsements on the 
Promissory Note were to Wells Fargo, and there was no indorsement "in blank" and certainly no 
indorsement to Respondent, meaning that Freddie Mac was not the owner of the Note entitled to 
purchase by credit bid; thus, under Appel it was improper for the Trustee to have deeded the 
Subject Property to Freddie Mac because it was Wells Fargo that owned her mortgage loan at the 
time of the foreclosure sale. At the Trustee's Sale, only Wells Fargo had the right to issue a 
credit bid, not Freddie Mac. The record discloses that there never was an Assignment of Deed of 
Trust to Respondent that was recorded in the real estate and mortgage records of Ada County in 
the time and manner specified in I.e. §45-1505(1). These facts were disputed facts presented by 
Ms. McCluskey to both the Magistrate and the District Court. 
When considering summary judgment, Idaho requires that disputed facts should be 
construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences should have been 
drawn in her favor. Major v. Security Equipment Corp., #38414, _ Idaho _, at 4, (Aug. 13, 
2013); Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011); (quoting Castorena 
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v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010)). Had the Magistrate considered all 
reasonable inferences favorably to Ms. McCluskey and construed the disputed facts in favor of 
Ms. McCluskey, then summary judgment could not have been entered granting Plaintiff 
possession of the Subject Property because the Trustee's Sale was invalid and the Trustee's Deed 
void as there was no proof of ownership of the Note by indorsement and no proof of recording of 
an Assignment of Deed of Trust. 
The due process rights of Ms. McCluskey were violated by the Magistrate who stated at 
the hearing of November 22, 2011 that he would review all of the evidence submitted by the Ms. 
McCluskey, however, the Magistrate cut off Ms. McCluskey as she was making her argument 
with the promise to review what she submitted and then failed to review any of the evidence 
submitted by her. That is, the Magistrate entered his ruling granting summary judgment on 
November 25, 2011 before Ms. McCluskey had the opportunity to submit her response to the 
evidence submitted by Freddie Mac on November 21, 2011 
Had the Magistrate looked into the actual ownership of the Note, the only decision on 
summary judgment would have been that Respondent had no legal authority to claim ownership 
or possession of the Subject Property or ejectment therefrom. To the extent that Respondent had 
no legal authority, then the Magistrate Court would have been compelled to decide as a matter of 
law that it lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment for Respondent and the Complaint 
should have been dismissed. 
Additionally, Ms. McCluskey asserted in her pleadings that she was not in default of 
payment of the Promissory Note because she was in compliance with the terms of the HAMP 
Appellant's Brief Page 15 
loan modification the terms of which had been dictated by Wells Fargo, as the lender. Ms. 
McCluskey had put her entire life savings down on the property of $80,000. Then Ms. 
McCluskey was instructed to stop making payments as specified under the original Note, and she 
was required to make all future payments at as specified in the loan modification. Further she 
was required by Wells Fargo to file for bankruptcy to discharge all of her other creditors so that 
there would be no dispute that she would have the financial ability to make all modified loan 
payments. Ms. McCluskey was then required by Wells Fargo to payoff the second position 
mortgage on her property. 
Wells Fargo required Ms. McCluskey to agree to the terms of and make all the payments 
for three trial loan modifications under HAMP. Ms. McCluskey complied with all these terms 
exactly as required and had paid a total of $130,000 over a six year period on a loan in the 
amount of $147,900 by the completion of the three HAMP loan modifications. Wells Fargo 
proceeded to foreclosure on the Subject Property without giving proper notice by posting, as to 
the date of the Trustee's Sale. After her full compliance with the HAMP terms presented to her 
by the lender, her evidence showed that the lender then acted in bad faith by conducting what 
amounts to a secret foreclosure sale without proper notice to her of the time, date and place of 
said sale and by failing to post the property as required by I.C. §4S-1S06(S). Plaintiffwas denied 
the opportunity to asserted that she was not in default of payment of her loan before the 
foreclosure sale because said loan was modified by Wells Fargo under HAMP Guidelines and 
because she was in full compliance therewith and that notice had not been given of the sale as 
required by Idaho Statute. 
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Default is a material fact, that when challenged by the evidence offered by Defendant, 
presents a genuine factual issue negating the ownership and possession claim of Wells Fargo the 
only party with the right to issue a credit bid. By substituting Freddie Mac as the party 
submitting the credit bid, Respondent attempted to situate itself in the position of a Bona Fide 
Purchaser for Value Without Notice as the Trustee's Sale requiring an evidentiary hearing and, if 
this disputed issue was considered in her favor, it would not have been possible for a summary 
judgment to grant possession of her property to Respondent. 
The finding by Judge Bieter that compliance with HAMP was not relevant was an error 
as a matter of law when he made no additional findings that compliance with HAMP, a program 
initiated by Wells Fargo as a replacement of the original terms of the mortgage on the Subject 
Property. Since, it was Defendant's position that she detrimentally relied upon the lender's 
adoption of HAMP Guidelines in her case and induced her participation in the HAMP program 
by insisting that she stop making the initial mortgage payments and only make the HAMP 
modified payments and that under the modified terms of the loan she was in compliance with all 
payments required rather than in default. 
Certainly, this is a disputed fact, which if taken in the light most favorable to Defendant 
would result in a determination in her favor, at least as to a disputed fact on summary judgment 
because if decided in her favor would lead to the dismissal of the ejectment action for lack of 
jurisdiction over Respondent's claim. By Idaho law, Ms. McCluskey is and should be entitled to 
all reasonable inferences from the disputed facts. Since Ms. McCluskey raised the issue of 
whether all required notices of foreclosure sale were given and specifically asserted factually that 
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the lender did not post the property prior to the "secret" foreclosure sale preventing Defendant 
from attending the sale and raising her objections thereto. Improper notice makes the sale void 
and denies Plaintiff the right to claim ownership for the purpose of an ejectment action (Cite). 
This is also a fact that defeats Summary Judgment and requires determination by the Trier of 
Fact to render a decision. Due to the foregoing issues having been timely presented, Summary 
Judgment should not have been granted and the lower courts decisions must be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings. 
Issue No.4: Whether Freddie Mac was entitled to claim the status of a bona fide 
purchaser for value under the shelter rules of I.e. §§45-1508 and 45-1510 when it was the 
successor lender that offered a credit bid at the May 16, 2011 Trustee's Sale and whether such 
assertion was in violation of I.C. §45-1506(9). 
Argument No.4. Freddie Mac was not entitled to claim the statutory shelter offered 
by I.e. §§45-1508 and 45-1510 because it was on either actual notice of Ms. McCluskey's 
loan modification compliance or it was on inquiry notice because of its supervisory role 
over Wells Fargo in the HAMP program. 
Issue No.5: Whether there was a question of fact presented to the Magistrate as to 
whether Freddie Mac had a valid interest in the Subject Property as a result of the foreclosure 
sale when it violated its own rules and regulations against Dual-Tracking by participating in 
foreclosure on the Subject Property. 
Argument No.5. Freddie Mac was in charge of enforcing its own rules that 
prohibited Dual Tracking, or prevented a bank, such as Wells Fargo from conducting a 
loan modification and at the same time pursuing foreclosure. Because of this rule violation 
by Wells Fargo and the knowledge that Freddie Mac had or is imputed, Freddie Mac was 
estopped from purchasing at foreclosure sale the Subject Property which was promoting a 
violation of its own rules. 
Issue No.6: Whether the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction over this case because Freddie Mac was 
not the lawful owner of a right of possession of the Subject Property. 
Argument No.6. Because Freddie Mac had no legal authority to purchase by credit 
bid, it did not own a right to possess the Subject Property and had no right to bring this 
action for eiectment. Therefore, there was no jurisdiction in the trial court to grant 
summary judgment of possession to Freddie Mac. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. McCluskey presented numerous disputed issues of fact that, if properly considered 
by the courts below should have prevented summary judgment and caused the court to grant an 
evidentiary hearing. This case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised 
herein. 
DATED THIS 19th day of February, 2014. 
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